In a recent article, L. Angel ([2001]) argues that if we do not implement Newtonian physics adding to it a certain usual type of boundary condition, then this leads to the rejection of what he calls the P principle: 'the composition of contact interactions does not create a noncontact interaction.' Here I shall demonstrate that this conclusion does not follow. However, as will be made clear, this in no way diminishes the interest or importance of the model introduced by Angel in his paper.
1 Introduction 2 The 'impact without contact' argument 3 Taking self-excitations seriously 4 Some interesting implications 1 Introduction sense of being implied by classical mechanics. To justify them it would be necessary to implement classical mechanics with a new postulate. However, as will be made clear, this in no way diminishes the interest or importance of the model introduced by Angel in his paper.
The 'impact without contact' argument
In what follows I shall concentrate on the initial condition (IC) introduced by the author with M at rest (there are many variations, but all of them are essentially equivalent with respect to the issue in question). The accurate characterisation of IC and the relevant notation related to it (which I shall use) are expounded concisely in Section 3 ('The initial condition') of Angel's article. I refer readers to this section for any further clarification in this respect. The following result is a central point in his argument: if IC occurs at t 0 then after t 0 M has escaped from the cosmos (this entails an impact without contact). He makes no effort to demonstrate this, perhaps because it is supposedly self-evident. Nor do I know of anyone in the literature who has done so. I shall make the effort here, because it will enable us to see clearly the point at which I begin my questioning of his results. My argument will be more general, i.e., from t 0 M will have 'escaped from the cosmos', independently of the details of the impact (in a somewhat long-winded aside, Angel argues that there can be no impact of NPi, PPi on M in the conventional sense, i.e., impact with contact). Let us suppose that, for a fixed but arbitrarily small e > 0, a momentum P e that is finite (in particular perhaps null) is transferred to M in the interval of time [t 0 , t 0 þ e]. This includes the possibility of there being several transfers of momentum to M in this interval: we look first at the global count of the momentum transferred therein, P e . But then each of the impacts that may occur in [t 0 , t 0 þ e] may not transfer to M a momentum greater than P e , because otherwise the sum of all of them could not be P e or converge to P e in the case of infinite impacts (remember that M receives at most impacts 'from the same side' and therefore the sign of the momentum received cannot change). Consequently, the maximum velocity that M can reach in [t 0 , t 0 þ e] will be P e (assuming unit mass) so that in this interval it cannot run a distance greater than e Á P e . According to the principle of action and reaction (Newton's 3rd law), in [t 0 , t 0 þ e] a momentum ÀP e is transferred to the infinite system of particles NPi, PPi. At t 0 the velocity of the pair NPi, PPi is a Vi that tends to the infinite with i ! 1 and, as all these particles have the same unit mass, that will continue to be true after receiving the finite momentum ÀP e . Indeed, remembering that the sum of the instantaneous transfers of momentum at [t 0 , t 0 þ e] must be ÀP e and all of them must have the same sign (except in the case of null transfer). This means that no NPi, PPi may receive, either instantaneously or globally in the interval [t 0 , t 0 þ e], a momentum of absolute value greater than P e as all momentum they receive must come from M. Therefore, if, as is the case, there are at t 0 infinite particles with velocities greater than any given number this will also occur at t 0 þ e. In other words, at t 0 þ e there will be infinite particles that will have covered a distance greater than e Á K for any number K. Choosing K ¼ P e , we arrive at the absurd conclusion that at t 0 þ e there will be infinite particles NPi, PPi which will have covered a distance greater than that covered by M (viz., e Á P e ). Since we reasonably assume that the material bodies of classical mechanics are impenetrable, this conclusion is topologically impossible.
1 Our starting supposition must be false and, therefore, for any arbitrarily small e > 0, the momentum (and, with it, the velocity) transferred to M at [t 0 , t 0 þ e] cannot be finite. As the momentum of M at t À 0 is null, it follows that M cannot have finite momentum for any arbitrarily small t 0 + e and that, given the definition of momentum, it is meaningless to talk of the momentum of M for t>t 0 . Since Newton's laws of motion are prescriptions for the momentum of any material system, and of its variations, it follows that they are inapplicable to M after t 0 . And since in classical mechanics Newton's laws are, by definition, universal, it follows that there cannot be any such object M after t 0 .
2 Further, as the movement of M before t 0 was inertial and, under the first law, this would again be the case afterwards if there were no interaction to disturb it, it follows that at t 0 M interacts with the infinite system of particles NPi, PPi. This is the impact without contact described by Angel and which, to put it picturesquely, provokes M's 'flight from the cosmos'. Since M does not exist for t>t 0 , it follows that in this model there can be no impact with contact.
Taking self-excitations seriously
A first observation on the above argument. As M does not exist after t 0 , it is meaningless to talk of change in the momentum of M at t 0 . The third law is
Taking Self-Excitations Seriously: On Angel's Initial Condition 321 only vacuously true for M at t 0 . But note that the existence of an interaction on M at that instant has been deduced from the first law. A further, more important observation. The previous argument depends crucially on the supposition that all the momentum that any of the NPi, PPi might receive from t 0 must come, in the last instance, from M. This does not mean that the NPi, PPi cannot collide with each other (they might or they might not); what it means is that any change in the momentum of NPi (PPi) with respect to its momentum at IC must contribute with a change (of contrary sign) in the momentum of M. How do we know this is so? Could the NPi (PPi) not receive momentum from the NPj (PPj), j 6 ¼ i, without this being reflected in a change of the momentum of M and therefore without interacting with it? In Angel's model (IC) this would in fact mean the selfexcitation of the system formed by the NPi (PPi), and we know from Lanford ([1975] ) that the self-excitation of a system of particles is not completely unthinkable. Besides, I have shown elsewhere ([1996] ) that self-excitation is possible for some systems of particles with a spatial configuration identical to the one presented by the NPi (PPi) at t 0 .
All this raises some serious doubts about the demonstrative value of the impact without contact argument. Anyone defending it is forced to demonstrate that in Angel's model the self-excitations of the type mentioned are not possible. Although a difficult problem to deal with, it is not a cause for concern because, in any case, we can demonstrate the possibility of other kinds of self-excitations capable, definitively, of ruining the demonstrative value of the argument (although not its interest, as we shall see).
Let us first ask ourselves if the NPi (PPi) could not receive momentum after t 0 from particles that did not exist before t 0 , without, therefore, interacting with M. The answer is that they could. In my ([1998] ), I showed how any empty, arbitrarily small region of space can spontaneously self-excite, provoking the creation of an infinite set of particles (of finite size if necessary) which, after an arbitrarily small interval of time, come to rest in a certain inertial system. Let us call such particles 'target particles'. We would then say that the vacuum has self-excited in a certain interval of time and produced target particles.
3 Now it is easy to see how the NPi (PPi) can receive momentum from target particles without there being an interaction with M. The centre of NPi is at a certain point (x,1) at t 0 and takes a time (1ÀCLi)/2 i to arrive at (x, CLi) (CLi is, in Angel's terminology, the radius of NPi). Let us now suppose that a small region of space (different in each case) self-excites producing, among others, target particles BNi 1 , BNi 2 , . . . at rest, all with the same coordinate x as NPi. Let BNi j be between BNi jÀ1 and BNi j+1 , with BNi 1 between NPi and BNi 2 . Finally, let all the BNi j be integrally located above the axis X (y ¼ 0). In these conditions, each infinite set of particles NPi, BNi 1 , BNi 2 , . . . performs in a finite interval of time less than (1ÀCLi)/2 i a supertask similar to the one which I described in ([1996] ): NPi passes its momentum onto BNi 1 , this to BNi 2 and so on successively. But as all the BNi j are above y ¼ 0, there is no passing of momentum to M. With the argument repeated for the PPi, it is clear that it is not true that any change in the momentum of NPi (PPi) with respect to its momentum in IC must contribute with a change (of contrary sign) in the momentum of M. In this exact sense, it is not true that any momentum that any NPi (PPi) might receive after t 0 must in the last instance come from M. This crucial supposition of the impact without contact argument does not hold and, consequently, the conclusion of the argument is not justified. It has taken no account of the possibility of the momentum of each NPi (PPi) at t 0 being 'absorbed' by an infinite number of target particles created a short time after by the self-excitation of the vacuum, without M being affected at any time. This is what enables us to see in a general way that neither Angel's model, nor any other, may be adduced as proof of impact without contact in classical mechanics (without, as we shall see, first adding to this a special postulate): if two systems of particles A and B impact supposedly without contact at t 0 , then (by definition of contact) its distance at t 0 is finite. But then, in that finite space that separates them, the vacuum may self-excite giving rise to infinite groups of particles which absorb, without subsequent transmission, all or part of the momentum of the components of A and B, thereby preventing any exchange of momentum between the two systems, even for t>t 0 . In particular, Angel is mistaken when he states:
Examination of IC shows the inconsistency of the principle of necessity and sufficiency of narrow closure for impact in Euclidean spacetime and for Newtonian laws of motion and collision (without gravitation) where infinitely many particles and unbounded velocity sets are permitted.
The permission of infinite particles and unbounded velocity sets are in fact necessary conditions for self-excitation of a vacuum in particles. From the foregoing discussion, it follows that, if the P principle is to lead to contradiction in classical mechanics, the latter must be implemented with a new postulate establishing that at least some self-excitations (which would have to be specified) of a certain, non-empty, class E of self-excitations (possible in principle) do not take place. Let us call this principle P E . E is certainly not empty as it contains, at the very least, self-excitations of finite Taking Self-Excitations Seriously: On Angel's Initial Condition 323 regions of empty space. It should indeed be remembered that the general argument I have given above against any supposed proof of impact without contact collapses if it is postulated that self-excitations of finite regions of space do not occur. Besides, E might contain examples of self-excitations of various infinite systems of particles (not of the vacuum): we should also remember the doubts about the possible self-excitation of the set of NPi (PPi) in Angel's model. 4 In any case, P leads to contradiction only if P E is added to classical mechanics. Failure to acknowledge the crucial necessity of P E means completely ignoring the role of self-excitations in this theory. Thus, contrary to what Angel holds, it is not necessary to add anything to classical mechanics to make it compatible with P. Quite the reverse, in fact: in order to make classical mechanics incompatible with P, one needs to implement it (P E ).
Some interesting implications
I stated at the beginning that my negative conclusions in no way diminished the interest or importance of the model introduced by Angel. Now is a good moment to see why. Let us suppose that in his model no self-excitations whatsoever occur after t 0 . As we have seen, this would imply impact without contact between the set of NPi, PPi and M. But if we accept the P principle, this cannot occur. It follows that in his system self-excitations must take place after t 0 . This is quite remarkable. Until now self-excitations have been considered as totally unpredictable processes: if they were possible, that was all that could with certainty be said about them. Angel's model provides us with the first example which shows that, sometimes, a little more can be said. If we accept P, then after t 0 self-excitations are not only possible, they are in fact bound to occur. What Angel has discovered is that in the classical mechanics of particles an innocent principle such as P leads in certain situations to what we might call (by analogy with what is known in quantum electrodynamics) induced or stimulated self-excitation. Further, it is clear (as Angel himself notes) that in his model the impact without contact leads to the violation of the principle of the conservation of mass in Earman's version ([1986] ). This, leaving aside any speculation regarding the 'philosophy of the impact', enables us to formulate the following general consequence: under certain conditions, stimulated self-excitation follows from the principle of the conservation of mass in classical mechanics. In the light of the discussion in the present paper, self-excitation should now cease to be regarded only as an oddity, a pathology of classical mechanics. It also functions (although in a new sense) as a guarantee against other pathologies, such as impact without contact or the non-conservation of mass (bear in mind that mass is conserved, in Earman's sense, in all processes of self-excitation of the vacuum mentioned above). It is interesting to find that, to these effects, it is capable of playing a role that might otherwise be thought to be reserved for more or less ad hoc boundary conditions, such as the requirement of a finite number of particles or a bounded set of velocities. However, as I have just suggested, there is an important difference between the role of boundary conditions in the elimination of pathologies and the role of self-excitations. An adequate set of boundary conditions (b.c.) added to classical mechanics (M.C.) means that the failure of P (or the non-conservation of mass, at least to the extent that it follows from the failure of P) is not compatible with M.C. + b.c. and that therefore M.C. + b.c. does not lead to the failure of P. We can say that it eliminates pathologies in a strong sense. However, the possibility of self-excitations only eliminates pathologies (failure of P; failure of the conservation of mass, at least to the extent that it follows from the failure of P) in a weak sense: it means that M.C. does not lead to the failure of P-although obviously it does not prevent M.C. from being compatible with the failure of P! 5 But this weakness is very interesting: although the possibility of selfexcitations does not eliminate the aforementioned pathologies in a strong sense, it provides us with the procedure to do so. If you wish to eliminate in the strong sense the pathological failure of P in M.C., just add P as an additional postulate to M.C. (it's that simple, without b.c. of any kind): the possibility of self-excitations guarantees the logical consistency of this operation 6 . To end I should like to point out that none of the comments made above is designed to diminish the importance of what is perhaps the most interesting alternative: to forget P and P E and formulate a principle of conservation of Taking Self-Excitations Seriously: On Angel's Initial Condition 325 5 It is now also clear why the other conclusions of Angel I referred to in the Introduction do not follow in the strong sense mentioned therein. Since, although M.C. is compatible with the failure of P, it does not imply the failure of P, it follows that, although M.C. is compatible with impact without contact and with the mechanical emergence of action-at-a-distance effects, it does not imply either impact without contact or the mechanical emergence of action-at-adistance effects. 6 Otherwise, if self-excitations were not possible in M.C., then M.C. would lead to the failure of P (the example with IC would prove it), and obviously we could not eliminate the pathological failure of P in M.C. by adding P to the latter without losing consistency. That M.C. leads to the failure of P is, it should be remembered, what Angel maintains in his paper. Wrongly, as it happens, as he does not take account of the possibility of self-excitations. 
